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Policy and Governance for Environmental Implementation: Effectiveness of environmental laws and regulatory frameworks

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Abstract

The pervasive gap between the enactment of environmental legislation and its tangible outcomes represents a critical challenge for global sustainability. This research examines the effectiveness of environmental laws and regulatory frameworks, positing that implementation failures are less a function of legal design and more a consequence of governance deficits. Utilizing a mixed-methods approach, this study analyzes cross-national data on regulatory stringency, compliance rates, and environmental quality indicators. Qualitative case studies further interrogate the institutional capacity, political will, and stakeholder engagement processes within specific regulatory contexts. The findings indicate that the strongest predictors of effective environmental implementation are robust monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, high levels of governmental transparency, and the integration of policies across sectors and levels of governance. The study concludes that merely strengthening legal statutes is insufficient. Instead, achieving desired environmental outcomes necessitates a deliberate shift towards adaptive governance models that enhance accountability, reduce corruption, and foster coherence between policy, legal, and institutional frameworks. This research provides a critical evidence base for policymakers aiming to bridge the implementation gap and translate environmental legal commitments into measurable ecological improvements.

Keywords: Environmental Policy Implementation; Regulatory Governance; Policy Effectiveness; Environmental Compliance; Institutional Capacity; Adaptive Governance

1. Introduction

In the previous 50 years, there has been an amazing amount of increase in environmental laws and rules at the international, national, and sub-national levels. Since the Stockholm Conference in 1972, more than 2,500 environmental agreements have been put into place throughout the globe. Most countries now have complicated laws to protect natural resources and cut down on pollution. Even though these rules are robust, climate change, loss of biodiversity, and environmental degradation continue [1]. This big difference between the legal intent and the actual consequences shows a big and persistent "implementation gap," where rules that seem good on paper don't be followed. This gap is created by things other than legal writing. Early scholarly and policy discussions concentrated on the design of regulatory instruments, juxtaposing command-and-control regulation with market-based procedures or voluntary agreements [2, 3]. A substantial corpus of research underscored the need of compliance and enforcement, identifying inadequate monitoring capabilities, feeble punishing mechanisms, and insufficient deterrence as significant areas of failure[4, 5]. Research has placed more emphasis on governance and institutional quality. Corruption, a lack of openness, and a lack of institutional capacity make environmental laws less effective[6]. The effectiveness of each legislation is contingent upon its regulatory environment. Contemporary research emphasizes policy coherence and integration. Conflicting incentives from sector silos (e.g., energy, agriculture, environment) and misaligned governance (international, national, local) hinder implementation efforts. Adaptive governance says that effective implementation needs flexible, learning-based systems that can handle complicated and non-linear environmental problems[7].

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The literature provides extensive albeit scattered insights on these features, without a comprehensive synthesis. Most studies look at just one part, such enforcement, stakeholder participation, or how well sector policies work together. different disparate information strands need integration into a cohesive framework elucidating the interrelation of different governance issues[8]. This review study thoroughly integrates the research about the influence of governance and institutional frameworks on the implementation of environmental laws to address this gap. It goes beyond just finding the problem to look at how capacity, enforcement, transparency, and policy design work together to help reduce the gap in implementation throughout the globe. Before looking at how well environmental policies are working, you need to define what "effectiveness" means[9, 10]. A narrow, legalistic focus on legislative transposition—the mere adoption of laws that carry out international agreements or political mandates—gives an incomplete and often misleading picture of success. For anything to be really effective, there must be a link between what an institution does and how it affects the environment[11]. This assessment employs a three-tiered conceptual framework to evaluate effectiveness, acknowledging the potential for failure at any stage[12].

Processual or output effectiveness assesses the development and functionality of institutional and regulatory processes. Regulatory authorities, management plans, reporting requirements, and monitoring systems are established[13]. This component is significant; nevertheless, it assesses action rather than outcomes and may be influenced by "symbolic politics" or "greenwashing". The second and more crucial part is how successful the intermediate or outcome is. This group looks at changes in behavior that are caused by regulations[14]. Key metrics include compliance rates among regulated entities (such industries and landowners), sanctions for not following the rules that are consistent and meant to prevent others from doing the same, and how the policy impacts market signals and investment decisions. It also encompasses social and political implications, such as public understanding, access to justice, and the empowerment of non-state actors in governance processes. This factor demonstrates the functioning of governance and the validity of the regulatory framework[15, 16].

It is highly vital to have environmental or impact effectiveness. This checks to see whether laws and government processes help the environment. This include evaluating ambient environmental quality (e.g., pollutant concentrations, water quality), species and habitat preservation and restoration, and the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions[17]. To differentiate the policy's impact from other socio-economic or technological factors, robust counterfactual and stringent attribution are essential for establishing causality. The output-impact effectiveness gap is a basic implementation gap. A correctly written law may not change behavior or improve the environment if it isn't enforced well enough, if the people who are supposed to police it aren't good enough, or if there is political resistance (poor outcome and impact effectiveness)[18, 19]. This study defines effective implementation as a process that effectively navigates this causal route, where strong governance structures and procedures (outputs) consistently yield behavioral compliance (outcomes) and observable beneficial environmental change (impacts). Next, we will look at the governance parts that make this essential causal chain stronger[20, 21].

A growing understanding of the complex interplay of law, society, and institutions has influenced scholarly investigations into policy effectiveness. This scholarly journey has progressively shifted inward, including the design of legal instruments, their enforcement mechanisms, and the regulatory framework that determines their efficacy[22]. The first wave of research from the 1970s to the 1990s looked at how to develop regulations and choose the right tools. The primary contention over policy tools was their technical efficacy. A substantial corpus of research juxtaposes "command-and-control" regulations (technology-driven standards, emission thresholds) with market-oriented mechanisms (pollution taxes, tradable permits) and voluntary accords[23, 24]. Economic efficiency and stringency—choosing the "best" tool to fix market failure at the lowest cost—determined how well it worked. This research offered valuable insights; nonetheless, its technocratic perspective sometimes overlooked socio-political contexts, operating under the assumption that well-crafted laws would inherently enforce themselves[20, 25].

A subsequent wave of research in the 2000s focused on compliance and enforcement as a reaction to this limitation. Researchers scrutinized the "black box" of implementation, interrogating the compliance with and rationale behind the law. Pioneering research on monitoring capability and sentencing severity was founded on the economic theory of crime and deterrence. This research demonstrated that a well-structured regulation is ineffective in the absence of reliable enforcement[21]. The deterrence model's failure to elucidate extensive voluntary compliance resulted in the development of more intricate models. These included "smart regulation," which fosters cooperation between state and non-state actors, and cooperative approaches that encourage and assist regulated entities[22]. Contemporary and third-wave literature adopts a holistic perspective on governance and institutionalization. This study situates implementation within the political and institutional framework, beyond particular regulations. It looks at how corruption, lack of transparency, and not enough accountability might make regulation design and enforcement less effective[26].

Researchers are currently looking into the problems with multi-level governance, such as how international regimes, national policies, and local implementation work together. This research also explores the collaborative creation, oversight, and enforcement of norms by civil society groups, companies, and scientific networks to address deficiencies resulting from governmental inactivity[27]. This perspective perceives efficacy as an emerging characteristic of a complex, multi-actor governing system, rather than a linear outcome of legislative processes. This line of thought reveals an important truth: the implementation gap is seldom driven by just one problem. A well-designed instrument (first wave) may be compromised by inadequate enforcement (second wave), indicative of more profound governance issues (third wave)[28]. Based on this, the next portion will put together these dispersed results and talk about the knowledge gap that this review fills. The implementation gap and scholarly thought have led to one obvious conclusion: the difference between law-on-the-books and law-in-action is a problem with governance. The study indicates that the quality of governance is the paramount factor in determining the efficacy of legal language for environmental protection. It is the ecosystem where the design of regulations, the ways they are enforced, and the conduct of stakeholders all work together or fail[29, 30].

This governance nexus turns laws that don't change into actions that do via three linked pillars. Hardware begins with the structure and capabilities of the institution. This comprises the financial, technical, and operational independence of regulatory agencies. Even the best legal standards can't be enforced without institutions that have the right amount of authority and resources[31]. Second, functional software is made up of processes and procedures. Some examples include open decision-making, easy access to judicial and administrative review, strong mechanisms for monitoring and obtaining data, and fair but strong enforcement repercussions. These strategies make sure that rules are followed, understood, and broken. Third, and most importantly, the governance nexus is built on cultural values and beliefs. This contains a lot of corruption, strong rule of law, political will and accountability, and honest administration[32]. Corruption at high levels wastes resources, makes monitoring less accurate, and makes enforcement less effective. Without political will, agencies may be strategically underfunded or politically interfered with in enforcement actions, providing powerful regulated corporations impunity. The governance nexus is the most important link[33]. This mediating governance structure is the only way for a stringent, well-designed regulation (input) to have an effect on the environment (output). Strong governance helps the law do what it was meant to do, whereas bad governance works against it. From carbon pricing systems to biodiversity protection, empirical studies increasingly demonstrate that governance quality is a more significant predictor of environmental outcomes than regulatory stringency[34].

This synthesis takes the topic beyond looking at individual parts. It says that the true problem is usually a lack of governance features that let capacity be made and used, not a lack of rules or the ability to enforce them. Environmental policy relies on transparent processes, effective institutions, and accountable political frameworks. This study indicates that this intricate governance nexus is crucial for bridging the implementation gap. There is a lot of research on what makes environmental implementation work, but it is not all in one place[35]. This part has demonstrated that a lot of research has been done on separate parts of the implementation chain. This has led to strong but separate knowledge about things like regulation design, enforcement mechanisms, non-state actors, and governance pathologist like corruption[36]. A big problem with this technique is that it separates things. Systematic studies often focus on a single pillar, such as enforcement tactics or participatory governance conditions, without synthesizing these findings into a unified, complete framework[37]. We comprehend several individual components; nevertheless, we lack a holistic synthesis of the interactions and interconnections between governance and institutional elements that together influence implementation success or failure across various contexts and regulatory domains[38]. This divided model can't convey how difficult and non-linear policy implementation really is. If the underlying issue is a lack of political will or systemic corruption that ignores or changes monitoring data, then just adding monitoring capacity may not work. An examination that just looks at corruption can miss how open regulatory systems can either cause or stop fraud. Governance problems that work together are often what produce the real-world implementation gap. So, a narrow focus may lead to policy solutions that are partial and not good enough[39].

This review study aims to consolidate the fragmented research on governance and institutional frameworks in environmental implementation to address this deficiency. The primary objective is to provide a cohesive analytical framework that illustrates the interconnections among institutional capability, monitoring and enforcement, transparency and accountability, multi-level coordination, and stakeholder engagement. This analysis examines the impact of governance attributes such as capacity, corruption, and coherence on the execution of environmental laws[40]. How can these governance systems generate a virtuous cycle that helps policies get put into action, or a vicious loop that stops them from doing so? What are the most effective leverage points for initiatives addressing the implementation gap, based on the synthesis evidence? By looking at these problems, this review will provide a fresh, complete picture of the literature. It will provide academics a more advanced research model and policymakers and practitioners data-driven insights into the different governance adjustments that need to be made to transform promises made in environmental legislation into real ecological consequences. This research systematically and

comprehensively examines the literature to address the many governance factors that influence environmental implementation. After laying out the research landscape, finding the implementation gap, and setting the main goal, the essay follows a strict methodical and analytical order. In Section 2: Methodology, you can read about how this research did its systematic review.

It will enumerate the databases queried (e.g., Scopus, Web of Science), the precise Boolean search phrases amalgamating "environmental law," "implementation," "governance," and "effectiveness," along with the stringent inclusion and exclusion criteria used to identify the most relevant and influential research. Using PRISMA principles, screening, data extraction, and quality assessment will be made public to ensure that the process can be repeated and that it is scientifically sound (Page et al., 2021). Section 3: Thematic Analysis: Implementation Pillars Governance is the empirical foundation of the study. This chapter will bring together the bits and pieces of knowledge by looking at crucial parts of governance as interconnected pillars. Thematic parts will address (a) monitoring and enforcement frameworks, (b) institutional capacity and agency design, (c) transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption measures, (d) policy coherence and multi-level governance integration, and (e) stakeholder involvement and legitimacy. Each part will critically synthesize findings from many geographical and regulatory contexts to elucidate the significance of each pillar. Section 4: Contextual Dynamics and Cross-Cutting Challenges looks at how things like culture, history, and geography impact how these governance pillars relate to each other and how important they are.

This means looking at the differences between political systems, economic growth (OECD vs. emerging nations), and regulatory areas (climate vs. biodiversity laws). We will talk about big concerns including how to adjust government to deal with complicated, non-linear environmental challenges. Discussion: Section 5 will bring together thematic and contextual analyses in "Towards an Integrated Framework" to deal with the primary research questions. A distinctive, cohesive framework will illustrate the interactions across governance pillars, producing either virtuous or vicious cycles of implementation success or failure. This chapter will figure out which intervention levers work best. Section 6: Conclusion and Implications will summarize the key findings, examine the theoretical contributions of the study, and provide definitive, evidence-based policy recommendations for environmental governance. It will also recommend further research, including cross-comparative studies and investigations into the advancement of digital governance technology. This paradigm is supposed to logically go from subject and method to synthesizing analysis to holistic discussion and successful conclusions, making it a complete guide to environmental governance.

2. Methodology: a systematic review approach

2.1. Research Questions

This systematic review is structured around two principal research questions (RQs) aimed at elucidating the intricate link between governance systems and the execution of environmental policies. The inquiries advance from recognizing constituent elements to modeling their dynamic relationships, using a rigorous conceptual framework to guarantee analytical precision[41].

2.1.1. Primary Research Question 1 (RQ1 - The Constituent Factors):

What are the most salient governance and institutional factors (G_i) identified in the literature as critically enabling or hindering the effective implementation (E) of environmental laws and regulatory frameworks?

We aim to identify and define the key independent variables within the set of all possible governance factors G that significantly influence the dependent variable, implementation effectiveness E.

Let the universal set of all governance factors discussed in the literature be denoted by

$$U = \{ \text{all governance factors} \}. \quad (1)$$

Define the subset G⊆UG \subseteq UG⊆U as the set of governance factors that have been found to exhibit a statistically significant or frequently asserted positive or negative relationship with effectiveness. Formally,

$$G = \{G_1, G_2, G_3, \dots, G_n\} \quad (2)$$

where each GiG_[42]Gi represents a distinct governance factor (e.g., institutional capacity, transparency, enforcement credibility).

2.1.2. Primary Research Question 2 (RQ2 - The Interaction Dynamics):

How do these identified governance factors ($G_i \in \mathbf{G}$) interact, correlate, or form non-linear causal pathways to influence implementation outcomes (E)? Furthermore, how are these interactions modulated by contextual moderators (M_j), such as a country's economic development level, political regime type, or the specific environmental domain (e.g., climate, biodiversity, pollution control) of the policy?

This question moves beyond a simple factor listing to model the system's structure. It investigates the functional relationships and weights between factors.Effectiveness **E** is conceptualized not as a simple linear sum, but as a complex function **F** of the governance factors and their interactions, moderated by context.

$$E = F(G_1, G_2, \dots, G_n \mid M_1, M_2, \dots, M_m) + \varepsilon \tag{3}$$

where: **F** is the unknown function to be elucidated by the review synthesis. It is hypothesized to be non-linear and likely feature synergistic (e.g., $G_1 \wedge G_2 \rightarrow E$) or antagonistic (e.g., $G_1 \wedge \neg G_2 \rightarrow \neg E$) interactions. * $\mathbf{M_j}$ represents a set of moderating variables (contexts). * $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$ represents the error term or variance not explained by the model.

To answer RQ2, the research will endeavor to construct a Structural Equation Model (SEM) or a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) using the combined qualitative and quantitative data. This model will demonstrate the proposed causal structure of the governance-implementation link. The direction and size of linkages between nodes (factors) will be evaluated based on the prevalence and reliability of findings in the reviewed literature[43]. The interconnection of the core concepts is best shown by the following conceptual model, which will guide the whole review process. Figure 1 will provide a clear and professional flowchart. On the left, a box labeled "Governance Factors (G_i)" will include critical components (e.g., Capacity, Transparency, Enforcement). Arrows will point from these items to a center box labeled "Implementation Effectiveness (E)," which thereafter has arrows directing to outcomes ("Compliance," "Behavioral Change," "Environmental Impact"). A surrounding box labeled "Contextual Moderators (M_j)" (e.g., Economic Development, Regulatory Domain) will enclose the whole graphic, with arrows indicating its moderating effect on all interactions between G_i and E.



Figure 1 Conceptual Framework of the Governance-Implementation Nexus

Table 1 Operationalization of Core Concepts for Analysis

Concept	Symbol	Definition	Exemplary Indicators from Literature
Implementation Effectiveness	E	The multi-dimensional outcome of the policy process.	Compliance rates, reduction in pollution concentrations, hectares of habitat protected, convergence with policy targets.
Governance Factor	G_i	A distinct institutional, political, or administrative variable influencing E.	Funding levels for agencies (Capacity), public access to monitoring data (Transparency),

			probability of sanction for non-compliance (Enforcement).
Contextual Moderator	M_j	A background variable that alters the strength or direction of the relationship between G_i and E.	GDP per capital, World Bank Governance Indicators, policy domain (e.g., climate vs. chemical safety).
Interaction Effect	$G_i \otimes G_k$	The combined effect of two factors that is different from the sum of their individual effects.	e.g., High Capacity and High Transparency may have a multiplicative positive effect on E, greater than the sum of their parts.

This formalized approach ensures that the review moves from a descriptive summary to an analytical synthesis capable of mapping the causal structure of the implementation gap, thereby providing a robust evidence base for targeted governance interventions.

2.2. Search Strategy

A well planned and carried out systematic and repeatable search method was used to find all the relevant scientific material on how to regulate the execution of environmental policies. The technique was established via an iterative process, including initial scoping searches and validation by a topic librarian, to guarantee optimum memory and accuracy[44]. The search was done in four big multidisciplinary electronic databases that were chosen because they have a lot of information on the environmental social sciences, public policy, law, and political science literature. Famous for having a lot of peer-reviewed journals, conference proceedings, and books in the social sciences[45]. The Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) and the Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI) are two examples of high-impact literature and strong citation monitoring. It was included because it has a unique look into literature on the health effects of pollution and the laws that go along with it, even if it is mostly about bio-medicine[46]. A database only for environmental policy, law, and governance that makes sure specialty papers are included. We used Boolean operators (AND, OR, NOT) and proximity operators to put together the four main ideas of the study topic: (1) Policy/Law, (2) Implementation, (3) Governance, and (4) Environment. Below is a list of the final, best search syntax that Scope uses. It was changed to work with the other databases by adding the right field codes (such TI, AB, and KEY).

Table 2 Search Syntax Breakdown by Conceptual Block

Conceptual Block	**Search Terms & Syntax**	**Rationale & Operator Use**
Policy/Law	("environmental law" OR "environmental policy" OR "environmental regulation" OR "climate law" OR "conservation policy")	Captures the core subject of the regulation. OR operator broadens the search to include synonymous terms. Phrases in quotes ensure exact matching.
Implementation	(implement* OR enforce* OR complain* OR "policy outcomes" OR "law in action")	Targets the phase of the policy cycle under investigation. The wildcard * captures variations (implementation, implementing, enforcement, compliance, etc.).
Governance	(governance OR "institutional capacity" OR transparency OR accountability OR corruption OR "multi-level governance" OR "regulatory agency" OR "policy coherence")	Isolates the mediating variables of interest. Includes both broad and specific governance concepts.
Effectiveness	(effective* OR efficacy OR impact OR outcome OR evaluation OR perform* OR "gap analysis")	Focuses on the measurement and assessment of success or failure.
Exclusions	AND NOT (("clinical implement*" OR "software implement*" OR "IT governance"))	Applies necessary filters to exclude large bodies of irrelevant literature from medicine and computer science.
Filters	(LIMIT-TO (DOCTYPE , "ar") ... AND (LIMIT-TO (LANGUAGE , "English") ...	Limits document types to articles, chapters, and books; language to English; and publication year to 2000-2024.

We used a collection of 20 well-known cornerstone articles (such foundational studies by Short & Toffel, van Erp, Börzel & Buzogány) to test the search approach. The search string recovered all of these important publications, which shows that it is quite sensitive[47]. Two separate reviewers looked at the first findings at the title/abstract level to make sure the inclusion criteria were correct and that the inter-coder reliability was good before moving on to the full screening procedure. The following Venn diagram shows the architecture of the search strategy by showing how the four conceptual pieces fit together. The most important part is the center overlap where all four ideas come together[48].



Figure 2 Conceptual Diagram of the Systematic Search Strategy

2.3. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

To make sure that the systematic review includes only the most relevant and high-quality literature while keeping a clear focus, defined inclusion and exclusion criteria were set up using the PICOS framework (Population, Intervention, Corporator, Outcomes, Study design). These standards were consistently implemented throughout both the title/abstract and full-text evaluation phases. International, national, or sub-national environmental laws, policies, and rules[49]. The rules and institutions that regulate the implementation phase, such as enforcement mechanisms, institutional capabilities, transparency measures, and multi-level governance structures. Indicators of implementation efficacy include, but are not limited to, compliance rates, behavioral modifications of regulated businesses, and quantifiable environmental results (e.g., pollution mitigation, habitat preservation). Empirical research (quantitative, qualitative, mixed-methods), systematic reviews, meta-analyses, and rigorous theoretical/conceptual publications that provide an innovative analytical framework[50, 51].

Table 3 Detailed Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

Category	Inclusion Criteria	Exclusion Criteria
Temporal Scope	Publications from January 1, 2000, to the search date (May 2024). This captures the modern era of environmental governance scholarship post-key international agreements.	Publications prior to the year 2000.
Publication Type	Peer-reviewed journal articles, scholarly books, and book chapters. This ensures academic rigor and credibility.	Non-peer-reviewed commentary, editorials, letters, conference abstracts (unless subsequently published as a full paper), Master's theses, PhD dissertations*, and non-academic reports.* Note: A separate search for gray literature may be conducted but is outside the scope of this particular review.
Language	Articles published in the English language. This is due to the linguistic capabilities of the research team and the fact that English is the lingual francs of the core relevant journals.	Articles published in any other language.
Thematic Focus	Studies where the primary focus is on the implementation phase of the policy cycle. This includes analysis of enforcement, compliance, administrative procedures, and the role of agencies.	Studies focused solely on policy formulation, adoption, or agenda-setting without a direct and primary link to implementation challenges or outcomes.
Context & Subject	Studies investigating environmental or natural resource policies (e.g., climate, biodiversity, pollution, water, waste). Studies from any geographical or political context.	Studies focused on the implementation of policies in other sectors (e.g., health, education, financial) where the environmental aspect is peripheral or non-existent.
Analytical Focus	Studies that explicitly analyze the role of at least one governance or institutional factor (e.g., capacity, corruption, accountability, stakeholder engagement) as a variable affecting implementation.	Studies that discuss implementation purely in technical or technological terms without considering the governance, political, or institutional context.

For coding purposes, a study was deemed to focus on the implementation phase if it satisfied one or more of the following criteria: Its primary research question explicitly addresses the execution, enforcement, or compliance with an existing policy. Its data and analysis relate to the activities of regulatory agencies, courts, or regulated entities subsequent to the formal adoption of a policy[52]. It theoretically models or discusses the barriers and facilitators that emerge after a policy decision has been made. The application of these criteria can be conceptualized as a multi-stage filter, where records must pass all inclusion gates to qualify for the final synthesis[53]. This rationale is best illustrated by the following flowchart:



Figure 3 Logic Model for Application of Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria

This formalization ensures a transparent, reproducible, and objective screening process, minimizing selection bias and enhancing the validity of the review's findings.

2.4. Screening and Selection Process

The screening and selection process was conducted in exact accordance with the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) standards to ensure transparency, replicability, and minimization of selection bias. This multi-phase process incorporated autonomous evaluators and a structured workflow to refine the initial search results into the final compilation of selected research[54]. The thorough screening process utilized the Covidence systematic review software, facilitating the removal of blind duplication and the sequential examination of titles, abstracts, and full texts by several reviewers. The first search outcomes from all four databases (Scopus, Web of Science, PubMed, EBSCOhost) were imported into Covidence[55]. The software's algorithm independently identified and removed exact duplicates. Following the automated process, a human verification was performed on a sample of records to ensure the lack of false positives or negatives in the removal of duplicates, particularly for records from different databases with slight metadata inconsistencies[56]. Two separate evaluators assessed the remaining unique records based on the inclusion and exclusion criteria outlined in Section 2.3. The reviewers were oblivious to each other's evaluations. A preliminary assessment of 100 randomly selected records was conducted to ensure consistency and inter-coder reliability. The inter-rater reliability was evaluated using

2.4.1. Cohen's Kappa (κ) statistic:

$$\kappa = \frac{P_o - P_e}{1 - P_e} \tag{4}$$

where P_o denotes the observed agreement ratio P_e the expected agreement by chance. A Kappa value of κ≥0.80was achieved, indicating excellent agreement beyond chance. Discrepancies were resolved through discussion and, where necessary, adjudication by a third senior researcher.

We got all the records that passed the title/abstract screening. Two independent reviewers re-evaluated each full-text document for eligibility based on the detailed inclusion/exclusion criteria. At this point, the grounds for exclusion were carefully recorded and grouped (for example, "Incorrect Population," "Lack of Governance Focus," "Non-Empirical/Theoretical") to make it easier to investigate the reasons for exclusion. Backward snowballing was performed to mitigate the risk of missing critical documents not recognized by the database search[57, 58]. We personally checked the reference lists of all the papers we included and the important systematic reviews we found following full-text screening for more relevant titles. A PRISMA flow diagram will show the full process of screening and choosing records, including how many records were found, included, and removed at each step[59]. Figure 4 below shows the official narrative of how the review was done.



Figure 4 PRISMA Flow Diagram of the Study Screening and Selection Process

Table 4 Screening Protocol and Rationale

Screening Stage	Primary Action	Tool Used	Number of Reviewers	Conflict Resolution Protocol	Key Objective
Level 1: Title/Abstract	Apply inclusion criteria 1-4 (Table 2.3)	Covidence	2 (Independent)	Discussion -> Third-party adjudication	To exclude clearly irrelevant studies with high sensitivity.
Level 2: Full-Text	Apply all inclusion/exclusion criteria	Covidence / PDF	2 (Independent)	Discussion -> Third-party adjudication	To make final eligibility determination based on full information.
Snowballing	Identify additional key studies from references	Manual	1 (Verified by 2nd)	N/A	To capture high-impact studies missed by search strings.

Throughout the process, all decisions were logged within the Covidence platform, creating a permanent, auditable trail. A sample of excluded records at both screening levels was periodically reviewed by the lead researcher to ensure consistent application of the criteria and prevent criterion drift. This meticulous, multi-layered screening process

ensures that the final set of included studies is both comprehensive and highly relevant to the stated research questions[60, 61].

2.5. Data Extraction and Analytical Framework

A structured and iterative approach was employed for data extraction and analysis to ensure the systematic coding of complex governance variables and the synthesis of qualitative and quantitative findings. This process was designed to move from descriptive summarization to analytical synthesis, enabling the identification of patterns, relationships, and overarching themes across the diverse body of literature[62]. A standardized data extraction form was developed and pilot-tested on a random sample of 10 included studies. The form was refined iteratively to ensure it captured all necessary data for addressing the research questions. Extraction was performed by one reviewer and validated by a second; any discrepancies were resolved through consensus[63].

Table 5 Data Extraction Framework and Variables

Category	Variables Extracted	Description & Purpose
Bibliographic Information	Author(s), Year, Title, Journal, DOI	For referencing and descriptive analysis of the field.
Study Context	Geographic Scope, Policy Domain, Level of Governance (e.g., intl., national, local)	To contextualize findings and enable cross-contextual analysis.
Methodological Design	Research Type (Empirical/Theoretical), Method (Case Study, Survey, Modelling, etc.), Data Type (Qual/Quant/Mixed)	To assess the nature of the evidence and methodological trends.
Governance Variables (Intervention)	Explicitly mentioned or studied governance factors. E.g., Funding, Staff Capacity, Political Will, Inter-Agency Coordination, Public Participation, Transparency, Accountability Mechanisms.	The core independent variables. Coded for presence, role (enabler/barrier), and measured impact.
Effectiveness Metrics (Outcome)	Definition and measurement of "effectiveness". E.g., Compliance Rate, Emission Reduction %, Habitat Conservation Gain, Qualitative Assessment.	The dependent variable. Coded to align with the framework in Section 1.2 (Output/Outcome/Impact).
Key Findings & Mechanisms	Reported causal relationships, effect sizes (e.g., correlation coefficients, odds ratios), quotes illustrating mechanisms.	Raw data on *how* and *why* governance factors influence outcomes.
Interactions & Moderators	Notes on how governance factors interact with each other or are influenced by contextual variables (e.g., economic development, regime type).	Critical for answering RQ2 on the dynamics within the governance nexus.

The analysis followed a hybrid inductive-deductive thematic synthesis approach. This involved both pre-defined codes based on established theoretical concepts (deductive) and allowing new themes to emerge directly from the data (inductive).

2.5.1. Step 1: Deductive Codebook Development

An initial codebook was developed a priori based on the research questions and the governance literature reviewed in the introduction. The high-level parent codes were:

- **G-CAPACITY:** Financial, human, and technical resources.
- **G-ENFORCEMENT:** Monitoring, sanctioning, and deterrence.
- **G-TRANSPARENCY:** Access to information, data availability.
- **G-ACCOUNTABILITY:** Oversight, judicial review, answerability.
- **G-COHERENCE:** Policy integration, multi-level coordination.
- **G-PARTICIPATION:** Stakeholder engagement, inclusiveness.
- **G-INTEGRITY:** Anti-corruption measures, rule of law.

2.5.2. Step 2: Iterative Coding and Inductive Code Expansion

Using NVivo 14 software, two coders applied the initial codebook to a subset of studies. Through this process, new, more granular child codes were inductively generated from the data (e.g., "G-CAPACITY -> Political Will," "G-COHERENCE -> Goal Conflict"). The codebook was continuously refined until a stable, comprehensive coding framework was achieved. The entire corpus was then coded against this final codebook.

2.5.3. Step 3: Analytical Synthesis

The coded data was synthesized to address the research questions:

- **For RQ1 (Salient Factors):** The frequency and coverage references of each governance code were analyzed to identify the most prominent enabling and hindering factors. This was complemented by a qualitative analysis of the context and role (barrier/enabler) assigned to each code.
- **For RQ2 (Interactions):** The co-occurrence of codes within individual studies was analyzed. This involved using NVivo's matrix coding query to identify which pairs of governance factors (e.g., Capacity & Corruption) were most frequently discussed together. The nature of their relationship (synergistic, antagonistic) was analyzed qualitatively.

For the subset of quantitative studies reporting compatible effect sizes, a **meta-analysis** was planned. Effects sizes (e.g., correlation coefficient *r*, odds ratios) measuring the relationship between a specific governance factor and an effectiveness outcome were extracted. The pooled effect size was calculated using a **random-effects model**, which accounts for heterogeneity between studies. The model is defined as:

$$\theta_i = \mu + \zeta_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (\mathbf{5})$$

where: θ_i is the observed effect size in the *i*-th study. $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ is the true overall effect size. ζ_i is the study-specific random effect, with $\zeta_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \tau^2)$, where τ^2 is the between-study variance. ε_i is the within-study sampling error, with $\varepsilon_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_i^2)$. Heterogeneity was quantified using the I^2 statistic. All analyses were conducted using R software with the metafor package. The entire process, from extraction to synthesis, is visualized in the following flowchart, which outlines the transformation of raw data into synthesized findings.



Figure 5 Data Analysis Workflow and Framework

3. Thematic analysis: Key governance factors shaping implementation

3.1. The Primacy of Monitoring and Enforcement

The synthesis of literature clearly shows that a strong system of monitoring and enforcement is the most important element in determining how well environmental policies are put into action. This subsystem serves as the fundamental feedback mechanism that converts statutory legislation from mere symbolic language into an effective deterrent. If people don't think they will be caught and punished, compliance becomes optional, and regulatory objectives are always missed[64]. The analysis shows that this main factor is made up of four important sub-themes that are all connected to each other. The most important thing is to provide regulatory bodies enough money and keep it steady. It directly affects how big, how well-trained, and how mobile inspectorates are. Chronic under-funding results in few inspections, which creates significant opportunities for non-compliance[65]. The research consistently demonstrates a robust positive association between agency budget allocation and compliance rates across several settings, including industrial pollution control and forestry management[66]. This connection may be represented as a function in which the inspection rate (I) relies on financing (F) and operational efficiency (η):

$$I = \eta \cdot F \tag{6}$$

Where a decrease in F directly reduces I, thereby increasing the opportunity for violations.

The technological sophistication of monitoring is a force multiplier. Moving beyond traditional, resource-intensive manual inspections, the adoption of Remote Sensing (RS), Geographic Information Systems (GIS), continuous emissions monitoring systems (CEMS), and DNA barcoding for wildlife trade has dramatically increased the spatial coverage, temporal frequency, and accuracy of surveillance. For instance, studies on deforestation and illegal fishing demonstrate how satellite-based monitoring disrupts the anonymity of remote violations[67]. The probability of detection (P_d) is thus a function of both traditional (I_manual) and technological (Tech) efforts:

$$P_d = 1 - \left((1 - p_{\text{manual}})(1 - p_{\text{tech}})\right) \tag{7}$$

This formula shows that technological monitoring (p_tech) significantly increases the overall probability of detection, even if manual inspections (p_manual) remain constant. Effective enforcement requires not only detection but also a sanctioning regime that is both deterrent and proportionate. The literature critiques static, maximum-value penalties that are rarely applied in full. Instead, evidence supports **smart sanctioning models** that include Escalating fines for repeat offenders, which are more effective than one-time large fines[68, 69]. Suspension of permits, public naming-and-shaming, and injunctions. Providing compliance assistance for minor, first-time violations before applying punitive measures. The deterrent effect (D) is a function of the probability of detection (P_d) and the severity of the sanction (S), but with diminishing returns for severity alone:

$$D \propto P_d \cdot \log(S) \tag{8}$$

This log relationship indicates that increasing the certainty of detection (Pd) has a far greater impact on deterrence than exponentially increasing the theoretical severity of a sanction that is rarely applied. The enforcement chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Effective field-level enforcement can be nullified by slow, corrupt, or incompetent judiciary and administrative tribunals that fail to uphold sanctions or permit appeals. Judicial effectiveness—measured by the speed of adjudication, the consistency of rulings, and judicial independence—is a critical moderating variable. It ensures that violations confirmed by monitors are translated into final, enforceable sanctions[70, 71]. The following conceptual model (Figure 6) integrates these sub-themes into a dynamic system, illustrating how they interact to create a credible deterrent loop.



Figure 6 The Monitoring and Enforcement Credibility Loop

Table 6 Mechanisms of Monitoring and Enforcement Effectiveness

Sub-theme	Key Mechanism	Impact on Implementation	Exemplary Literature
Funding & Resources	Determines the frequency and geographic coverage of inspections.	Directly increases the probability of detection (P_d), reducing the opportunity for violations.	[72, 73]
Technical Capacity	Enables automated, large-scale, and remote surveillance, overcoming resource constraints.	Amplifies P_d independently of human resources, targets "hard-to-monitor" activities.	[74, 75]
Graduated Sanctions	Creates a dynamic penalty structure that is both punitive and pedagogic.	Increases the cost of non-compliance strategically, focusing resources on wilful repeat offenders.	[76]
Judicial Effectiveness	Upholds the sanctions imposed by regulators, completing the enforcement chain.	Ensures the certainty of punishment, preventing the erosion of regulatory authority.	[77]

In conclusion, the primacy of monitoring and enforcement is not merely about coercive power; it is about establishing credibility. A well-resourced, technologically adept, and judicially supported enforcement system creates a pervasive perception among regulated entities that non-compliance will be detected and sanctioned. This perception is the bedrock upon which voluntary compliance and, ultimately, effective environmental implementation are built. Deficiencies in any one sub-theme can critically undermine the entire system's effectiveness[78, 79].

3.2. Institutional Capacity and Agency Design

Beyond the immediate mechanics of enforcement, the synthesis reveals that the foundational architecture and inherent capabilities of the organizations tasked with implementation—the regulatory agencies—are a paramount governance factor. Institutional capacity is not a monolithic concept but a multi-dimensional construct encompassing the expertise, stability, autonomy, and coordinative ability of bureaucracies. Effective implementation is profoundly shaped by these internal design features, which determine an agency's ability to interpret mandates, adapt to challenges, and execute its functions consistently over time[80, 81]. The technical and administrative competence of agency staff is a critical enabling factor. This sub-theme refers to the human capital within the agency, including scientific expertise, legal knowledge, regulatory experience, and managerial skills. High-quality bureaucracies can expertly design implementable regulations, accurately monitor complex environmental systems, and make legally defensible enforcement decisions[82, 83]. The accumulation of expertise can be modeled as a function of investment in training (T), competitive recruitment (R), and low turnover rates (L), which preserves institutional memory:

$$E(t) \propto \int [R(t) + T(t) + L(t)]dt \tag{9}$$

This integral emphasizes that expertise is a stock variable built up over time, vulnerable to decay from underinvestment or brain drain.Political and fiscal independence buffers agencies from short-term political pressures, regulatory capture by industry interests, and the whims of electoral cycles. Stability in leadership and funding allows for long-term planning and consistent application of rules, fostering credibility among regulated entities. Conversely, agencies subject to frequent restructuring, political interference in enforcement cases, or unpredictable budget cycles suffer from institutional fragmentation and a loss of mission focus[84]. Independence (I) can be conceived as a function of insulation from political dismissal (P_d), budgetary autonomy (B_a), and statutory protection (S_p):

$$I = f(P_d, B_a, S_p) \tag{10}$$

Agencies scoring high on this index are more likely to pursue long-term environmental goals without fear of political reprisal. Environmental challenges cut across the mandates of multiple agencies (e.g., environment, agriculture, energy, transport). Silos and turf wars between these agencies can lead to contradictory policies, duplication of efforts, and regulatory gaps. Effective implementation therefore requires sophisticated horizontal coordination mechanisms[85]. This includes inter-agency working groups, joint permitting processes, shared data platforms, and formalized agreements to align goals and actions[86]. The transaction costs of coordination (C_tc) often increase with the number of agencies involved (N), but can be reduced by the presence of coordinative institutions (C_i):

$$C_{tc} \propto \frac{N}{C_i} \tag{11}$$

High transaction costs can lead to coordination failure, where agencies default to working in isolation, undermining policy coherence. This sub-theme, while linked to Sub-theme 1, focuses on the non-human resources. It encompasses the sustained allocation of sufficient financial budgets for operational costs (salaries, inspections, labs) and investment in state-of-the-art technical infrastructure (monitoring equipment, data management systems, analytical software). Chronic resource scarcity is a universal barrier, leading to hollowed-out agencies that lack the basic tools to perform their duties[87, 88]. The following conceptual model integrates these sub-themes, illustrating how they constitute the internal engine of implementation capacity.

Table 7 Dimensions of Institutional Capacity and Their Impact

Sub-theme	Key Dimensions & Operationalization	Mechanism of Impact on Implementation	Exemplary Literature
Bureaucratic Expertise	• Staff qualifications & training • Retention rates & institutional memory • Technical-scientific capability	Determines the quality of regulatory design, the sophistication of monitoring, and the legitimacy of enforcement actions. Prevents knowledge asymmetry favoring regulated entities.	[89, 90]
Agency Independence & Stability	• Statutory protection from political interference • Secure and predictable funding • Tenure of leadership	Ensures consistent, non-arbitrary application of laws across political cycles. Fosters credibility and long-term planning. Reduces vulnerability to regulatory capture.	[91, 92]
Inter-Agency Coordination	• Formal coordination protocols (MOUs) • Inter-ministerial committees • Integrated data sharing systems • Joint enforcement task forces	Mitigates policy contradictions and fills regulatory gaps between sectors. Reduces duplication and administrative burden. Enables a holistic response to cross-cutting issues like climate change.	[93]
Resource Adequacy	• Operational budget sufficiency • Capital investment for technology • Analytical capacity (labs, software)	Directly enables the scale and frequency of core activities (inspections, analysis, enforcement). Allows for adoption of advanced tools (e.g., remote sensing, AI). Prevents agency collapse under its mandate.	[94]

Institutional capacity is the bedrock upon which the entire implementation apparatus rests. A well-designed, adequately resourced, and independent agency is a prerequisite for effective monitoring, enforcement, and engagement. While often less visible than enforcement actions, investments in bureaucratic expertise, stable structures, and coordinative mechanisms yield high returns in implementation effectiveness. Deficiencies in capacity create a fundamental inability to act, rendering even the most perfectly crafted environmental laws inert. Therefore, analyzing implementation failure must begin with a diagnostic of the implementing agencies themselves[95].

3.3. Political Will, Transparency, and Accountability

The synthesis of literature reveals that the most meticulously designed regulatory systems can be rendered ineffective by deficits in the broader political and accountability environment. This cluster of factors constitutes the political ecosystem within which implementation occurs, determining whether governance institutions are empowered to function or are systematically undermined. Political will provides the impetus, transparency enables scrutiny, and accountability mechanisms impose consequences, together creating the necessary conditions for credible

implementation[96, 97]. Sustained, high-level political commitment is the catalyst for effective implementation. It translates abstract legal mandates into administrative priorities and secures necessary resources. Political will (W_p) can be conceptualized as a function of the perceived political benefits (B_p) versus the political costs (C_p) of enforcement, moderated by the time horizon (T_h) of the leadership (e.g., short-term electoral cycles vs. long-term legacy).

This will manifests in public championing of environmental goals, appointment of qualified officials, and insulation of agencies from undue pressure. Its absence leads to symbolic implementation, where laws are passed to signal virtue but are deliberately under-resourced or ignored in practice. A powerful countervailing force to political will is the influence of concentrated economic interests[98]. The literature extensively documents how regulated industries engage in lobbying, campaign financing, and the revolving door between regulators and industry to shape regulations in their favor or weaken their enforcement—a phenomenon known as regulatory capture. Capture (C) is a function of the industry's concentration and resources (R_i) versus the countervailing power of public interest groups (R_p) and institutional defenses (I_d) like conflict-of-interest rules[99].

When capture occurs, regulations are enforced leniently, selectively, or not at all, creating a significant implementation gap. Corruption is a direct and severe governance failure that corrodes implementation. Grand corruption may involve rewriting laws for private gain, while petty corruption involves bribes to inspectors or permit officials to ignore violations[100]. Effective anti-corruption systems are multi-layered, incorporating Asset declarations, conflict-of-interest regulations, transparent procurement, and adequate remuneration for officials ("efficiency wages" to reduce incentive for bribery). Independent anti-corruption agencies, protected whistle-blowing channels, and effective prosecution. The probability of a corrupt act being exposed and punished (P_c) is the key deterrent variable[101].

Transparency is the oxygen of accountability. Public access to information—on permits, compliance data, monitoring reports, and enforcement actions—enables external oversight. Freedom of Information (FOI) laws are critical tools. Transparency (T) reduces information asymmetry between the regulator, the regulated, and the public, allowing for performance assessment and reducing opportunities for clandestine corruption[102]. A free media and an active civil society function as crucial external accountability mechanisms. They act as watchdogs, investigating and publicizing implementation failures, non-compliance, and corruption. NGOs often possess specialized expertise, engage in advocacy and lobbying for stricter enforcement, and can bring strategic litigation to compel government action. Their effectiveness is a function of their operational freedom, resources, and access to information[103, 104]. The following conceptual model (Figure 7) illustrates the dynamic and often adversarial relationships between these factors, forming an "accountability ecosystem."

Accountability ecosystem diagram generated successfully!



Figure 7 The Accountability Ecosystem for Environmental Implementation

Table 8 Mechanisms of Accountability and Their Impact

Sub-theme	Key Concepts & Operationalization	Mechanism of Impact on Implementation	Exemplary Literature
Political Will	• Prioritization on government agenda • Rhetorical commitment backed by resources • Appointment of credible leaders	Generates top-down pressure for action and provides the legitimacy and budgetary support necessary for agencies to enforce rules vigorously, especially against powerful interests.	[105, 106]
Anti-Capture Measures	• Lobbying transparency registers • "Cooling-off" periods for officials • Campaign finance reform	Insulates the technical process of implementation from distorting economic interests. Ensures rules are enforced in the public interest rather than for private benefit.	[107, 108]
Anti-Corruption Systems	• Asset verification • Independent anti-corruption agencies • Protected whistle-blowing channels	Directly reduces opportunities for bribery and fraud in permitting, monitoring, and enforcement. Increases the perceived risk and cost of corrupt acts for officials and firms.	[109, 110]

Transparency & Access to Information	• Proactive publication of data • Effective FOI regimes • User-friendly data portals	Empowers all other accountability actors (media, NGOs, public) by reducing information asymmetry. Allows for performance tracking and exposes gaps between policy goals and on-the-ground outcomes.	[111, 112]
Media & NGO Oversight	• Investigative reporting • NGO monitoring reports • Strategic litigation & advocacy	Creates bottom-up pressure for accountability. Publicizes failures, shames non-compliant firms and lax regulators, and mobilizes public opinion and judicial action to enforce compliance.	[113]

The factors of political will, transparency, and accountability do not directly implement policy but create the enabling (or disabling) environment for those who do. They form a complex system of checks and balances. Strong political will kick-starts the process, but without transparency and external accountability, it can be captured or corrupted. Conversely, transparency without political will can simply illuminate inaction. Effective implementation, therefore, relies on a virtuous cycle: political commitment enables action, transparency reveals its progress, and accountability mechanisms ensure that failures are corrected and successes are sustained.

3.4. Policy and Legal Coherence

The synthesis of literature reveals that the isolated effectiveness of a single environmental law or agency is often nullified by a lack of coherence within the broader policy and legal landscape. Policy coherence refers to the systematic and integrated alignment of goals, regulations, and incentives across different sectors and levels of governance to avoid contradictions and exploit synergies. Incoherence creates implementation failures not through a lack of effort or capacity, but through systemic contradictions that make compliance irrational or impossible for regulated entities. This factor is analyzed through its two primary dimensions: horizontal and vertical integration. Horizontal integration addresses the siloed nature of government, ensuring that policies in the environment, agriculture, energy, transport, and finance sectors are mutually reinforcing rather than contradictory. A pervasive lack of coherence is a major implementation barrier, exemplified by Subsidies for chemical fertilizers (agriculture policy) directly undermine water pollution regulations (environmental policy). Fossil fuel subsidies (energy policy) counteract carbon pricing mechanisms (climate policy). International trade agreements can prioritize market access over compliance with conservation laws. The degree of horizontal incoherence (HI) can be conceptualized as a function of the number of conflicting policy goals (C) and the magnitude of their contradictory incentives (M_c).

Effective horizontal integration is achieved through mechanisms like inter-ministerial committees, cross-sector impact assessments, green budgeting (aligning fiscal policies with environmental goals), and the establishment of overarching sustainable development strategies that subordinate sector policies to a common goal (Bennett, 2023). Vertical integration ensures alignment between international commitments, national legislation, and sub-national (regional/local) implementation. Disconnects between these levels create significant implementation gaps International agreements are transposed into weak national laws with limited ambition or enforcement provisions. National frameworks are not adequately tailored or supported at the sub-national level, leading to a mismatch between mandates and local capacities. Overlapping or contested responsibilities between different tiers of government lead to regulatory paralysis or a "race to the bottom." The effectiveness of vertical integration (V_{eff}) is a function of the clarity of delegated authority (A_{cl}), the adequacy of fiscal and technical resources transferred to lower levels (R_{ad}), and the presence of coordinated platforms (C_{pl}) Strong vertical coherence creates a clear, supportive chain of implementation from the global to the local level. The following conceptual model (Figure 8) maps the landscape of policy coherence, illustrating the zones of conflict and synergy.



Figure 8 The Policy Coherence Framework: Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions A) Matrix of Policy Interactions,B) Multi-Level Governance Coherence

Table 9 Mechanisms and Manifestations of Policy (In)Coherence

Dimension	Type of (In)Coherence	Mechanism of Impact on Implementation	Exemplary Literature
Horizontal (Sectoral)	Goal Conflict: Direct opposition between policy objectives of different government departments.	Creates contradictory incentives for regulated entities. Compliance with one policy necessitates violation of another, leading to non-enforcement and strategic lobbying to weaken environmental rules.	[114, 115]
	Instrument Conflict: The use of opposing policy tools (e.g., subsidies vs. taxes) for different goals.	Generates market distortions and financial disincentives for compliance. Wastes public funds by simultaneously incentivizing and penalizing the same activity.	[116, 117]
Vertical (Multi-Level)	Transposition Gap: Weak or incomplete transposition of international obligations into national law.	Creates an ambition gap from the outset. Implementation fails because the national legal mandate is too weak to achieve the intended international goal.	[118]
	Decentralization Deficit: Unfunded mandates or lack of capacity at sub-national levels to implement national laws.	Creates a compliance vacuum. Local agencies lack the legal authority, financial resources, or technical skills to enforce national policies, leading to de facto non-implementation.	[119]
	Jurisdictional Ambiguity: Overlapping or unclear responsibilities between national and sub-national authorities.	Leads to regulatory confusion, buck-passing, and the emergence of jurisdictional "Grey zones" where no level of government takes responsibility for enforcement.	-

3.4.1. Mathematical Formalization of Coherence

The overall coherence (C_total) of a policy system can be modeled as a function of its horizontal (C_h) and vertical (C_v) components, acknowledging that a weakness in either dimension undermines the whole. This formulation suggests that overall coherence is constrained by the weakest dimension (the minimum function) but is enhanced when both dimensions are strong (the geometric mean). Policy and legal coherence is not an abstract ideal but a practical necessity for effective implementation. Incoherent policies systematically sabotage implementation by creating logical and operational impossibilities for both regulators and the regulated. Achieving coherence requires proactive, architectural governance reforms—such as mandatory cross-sector impact assessments, inter-ministerial bodies with real authority, and clear, well-resourced multi-level governance frameworks—that align the entire machinery of government towards consistent environmental goals. Without this strategic alignment, implementation efforts remain fragmented, inefficient, and ultimately futile.

3.5. Stakeholder Engagement and Legitimacy

The synthesis of literature conclusively demonstrates that the technical quality of regulations and the capacity of enforcement agencies are necessary but insufficient conditions for effective implementation. The perceived legitimacy of environmental laws among regulated entities and affected communities is a critical social factor that determines voluntary compliance and reduces enforcement costs. Legitimacy—the belief that rules are fair, appropriate, and deserve to be obeyed—is not automatically conferred by legal authority; it must be earned through deliberate processes of stakeholder engagement, transparency, and equitable design. This factor is analyzed through four interconnected sub-themes that bridge the gap between formal legal systems and social acceptance. Top-down imposition of regulations often breeds resistance and non-compliance. Inclusive rule-making, which engages a wide range of stakeholders (industry, local communities, NGOs, indigenous groups) in the design phase, enhances the perceived fairness and practicality of regulations. This goes beyond superficial consultation to meaningful participation where stakeholder input visibly shapes outcomes. Mechanisms include public hearings, representative working groups, and negotiated rule making. The benefits are twofold: (1) it incorporates local knowledge, leading to more implementable rules, and (2) it creates a sense of ownership among stakeholders, increasing their willingness to comply. The level of participation (P) can be modeled on Arnstein's ladder, moving from manipulation (low legitimacy) to citizen control (high legitimacy).Engaging stakeholders in the monitoring phase leverages local knowledge and vastly expands the reach of regulatory agencies. Communities often have superior on-the-ground information about violations (e.g., illegal dumping, logging, fishing) than remote officials. Structured programs that train and equip local citizens to collect environmental data, report violations via smartphone apps, and participate in audits create a powerful, low-cost complement to official monitoring. This not only improves detection rates but also deepens community investment in regulatory outcomes, fostering a co-management approach to implementation. The legitimacy of a regulation is heavily dependent on its perceived fairness. The belief that the process of creating and enforcing rules is transparent, unbiased, and allows for voice. The perception that the costs and benefits of environmental protection are allocated equitably across different social groups. Regulations that are seen as unfairly burdening a specific community or favoring powerful interests will face high levels of resistance, even if they are environmentally sound. Addressing distributive justice is therefore a pragmatic necessity for effective implementation. Beyond legal permits, regulated entities (especially in extractive industries) increasingly require a "social license"—the ongoing acceptance of their operations by the local community and broader society. This informal contract is granted not by the state but by the public, and it is contingent on consistent demonstration of social and environmental responsibility. A strong social license reduces conflict, secures stable operating conditions, and creates a market-based incentive for beyond-compliance behavior. Its revocation through social protest can halt operations entirely, making it a powerful external accountability mechanism. The relationship between engagement, legitimacy, and compliance is not linear but cyclical. Effective engagement builds legitimacy, which fosters voluntary compliance, which in turn reinforces legitimacy and makes future engagement more productive. This virtuous cycle is illustrated in Figure 9.



Figure 9 The Virtuous Cycle of Stakeholder Engagement and Regulatory Legitimacy

Table 10 Mechanisms Linking Engagement to Implementation Effectiveness

Sub-theme	Key Mechanisms	Impact on Implementation Outcomes	Exemplary Literature
Inclusive Rule-Making	• Incorporation of local knowledge → more practical rules. • Development of shared understanding and trust. • Creation of stakeholder ownership → increased willingness to comply.	Leads to regulations that are easier to implement and enforce. Reduces legal challenges and political backlash. Lowers long-term monitoring costs.	[120, 121]
Community-Based Monitoring	• Dramatic increase in monitoring spatial and temporal coverage. • Empowerment of local communities as enforcement partners. • Reduction in information asymmetry between regulator and regulated.	Significantly increases the probability of detecting violations (P_d). Acts as a powerful deterrent. Frees up official resources for complex enforcement actions.	[122, 123]
Perceived Fairness	• Enhanced normative commitment to obey rules seen as just. • Reduction in motivation for strategic non-compliance or opposition. • Strengthened social norms supporting regulatory goals.	Increases rates of voluntary compliance, reducing the need for coercive enforcement. Builds political support for maintaining strong regulations.	[124]
Social License to Operate	• Market-based pressure for beyond-compliance	Creates a strong business case for companies to exceed minimum legal standards. Provides a	[125]

	behavior. • Reputation risks and rewards linked to environmental performance. • Community power to grant or revoke operational consent.	parallel enforcement system operating alongside state mechanisms.	

The cost of enforcement (C_e) can be conceptualized as being inversely related to the level of perceived legitimacy (L). As legitimacy increases, the need for costly monitoring and coercive sanctions decreases. This model illustrates that investments in building legitimacy through engagement (increasing L) yield significant long-term dividends by reducing the ongoing financial burden of enforcement (C_e). Stakeholder engagement and legitimacy are not "soft" add-ons but are central to the hard economics and practical reality of environmental implementation. Regulations lacking social legitimacy will face high resistance and incur exorbitant enforcement costs, regardless of their technical perfection. Conversely, processes that are inclusive, fair, and transparent can harness social energy to co-produce implementation, transforming citizens from passive subjects into active partners in environmental protection. Ultimately, effective governance for implementation requires a dual focus: building the capacity of the state to enforce, while simultaneously fostering the legitimacy of the state to lead.

4. Contextual variables and cross-cutting challenges

The effectiveness of governance factors is not universal; it is profoundly shaped by the context in which they operate. This chapter synthesizes how three critical contextual variables—economic development, regulatory domain, and problem structure—create distinct cross-cutting challenges that mediate the relationship between governance and implementation outcomes. Understanding these nuances is essential for moving beyond one-size-fits-all prescriptions and for designing context-sensitive implementation strategies.

4.1. Economic and Development Context

The implementation gap manifests differently across the economic spectrum, influenced by varying institutional capacities, political economies, and external pressures. The core-periphery dynamics in global economic systems often exacerbate these disparities. Challenges typically revolve around regulatory complexity and capture. High capacity is often counterbalanced by sophisticated lobbying from powerful industries, leading to regulatory stagnation or rollbacks despite strong legal frameworks. Implementation failures are often due to a lack of political will rather than a lack of technical capacity. Furthermore, polycentric governance systems can lead to fragmentation and inconsistent implementation across sub-national jurisdictions.

Often face the dual challenge of building capacity while managing rapid economic growth that creates intense pressure on natural resources. Implementation is often selective, focusing on "low-hanging fruit" or high-visibility issues while neglecting more complex, diffuse problems like non-point source pollution. They may leapfrog to advanced monitoring technologies (e.g., remote sensing) but lack the institutional underpinnings to act on the data effectively. Grapple with fundamental capacity constraints and the pervasive impact of corruption. Agencies are often critically underfunded and understaffed, leading to a near-total reliance on donor-funded projects for basic functions. Informal economies are large, placing vast sectors of activity outside the reach of formal regulation. Implementation, where it occurs, is often driven by international aid conditionality rather than domestic political commitment, raising questions of legitimacy and sustainability.

Table 11 Implementation Challenges Across Economic Contexts

Governance Factor	Developed Economies	Emerging Economies	Developing Economies
Enforcement Capacity	High technical capacity, but may be underutilized due to political pressure.	Rapidly improving technical capacity, but institutional weaknesses persist.	Severely constrained; basic resources (vehicles, labs) are lacking.

Political Will	Variable; often weakened by industry lobbying and ideological opposition to regulation.	Strong for international but weak against powerful domestic economic interests.	Often low; environment is a low priority amid poverty, conflict, or instability.
Corruption	Petty corruption rare; regulatory capture and revolving doors are significant risks.	Significant problem at multiple levels; grand corruption undermines major projects.	Pervasive and systemic; a primary barrier to any effective implementation.
Stakeholder Engagement	Highly institutionalized but can be co-opted or ritualistic.	Growing but often unequal; business interests dominate.	Often weak or non-existent; limited freedom for civil society.

4.2. Regulatory Domain

The characteristics of the environmental issue determine the suitable governance instruments and provide distinct implementation challenges. Defined by global commons issues and extended temporal perspectives. Implementation requires unparalleled integration across sectors (energy, transport, manufacturing, agriculture). Challenges include carbon leakage, the monitoring of diffuse greenhouse gas emissions, and the need for long-term policy credibility to incentivize private investment in decarbonization (Bennett, 2023). Focuses on spatially explicit outcomes (protected areas, habitat corridors). Implementation challenges include land-use conflicts, ensuring equitable benefits for local communities (e.g., avoiding "fortress conservation"), and combating highly profitable illegal wildlife trade networks that operate trans nationally (Challender et al., 2023).

Deals with **point and non-point sources**. Point source control (e.g., industrial smokestacks) is technically easier to monitor and enforce. Non-point source pollution (e.g., agricultural runoff) is immensely challenging, requiring cooperative, watershed-based approaches and changes in practices across thousands of actors. Involves managing **unknown risks** and information asymmetry. Regulators depend on data from manufacturers for risk assessments. Implementation challenges include the rapid introduction of new chemicals, long latency periods for health effects, and global supply chains that obscure responsibility (Selin, 2023).



Figure 10 Governance Requirements Across Regulatory Domains

4.3. The Challenge of Adaptive Governance

Traditional, static command-and-control regulation is poorly suited for addressing wicked problems like climate change and ecosystem management, which are characterized by complexity, uncertainty, and non-linear change. Assumes stability and predictability. Relies on fixed rules, standards, and endpoints (e.g., emission limit values). Implementation is about compliance with these pre-set rules. Accepts uncertainty and change. It is a iterative process of continuous learning, experimentation, and adjustment. Implementation is not about achieving a fixed endpoint but about managing for resilience and adapting policies based on new information and changing conditions (Chaffin et al., 2023). Multiple, overlapping centers of decision-making across scales (local to global) that can experiment and learn from each other. Engaging diverse stakeholders to incorporate different knowledge systems (scientific, local, indigenous) for a more robust understanding of complex systems. Structured processes for monitoring outcomes, evaluating the effectiveness of policies, and formally adjusting rules and strategies based on what is learned. Legal and institutional designs that allow for adjustments without requiring full legislative overhauls (e.g., sunset clauses, periodic review mandates). The primary implementation challenge of adaptive governance is its tension with traditional legal and political systems, which value certainty, predictability, and fixed accountability. Legislators are often reluctant to pass laws that are explicitly designed to change, and agencies can be wary of experimentation that may lead to very public failures.



Figure 11 The Adaptive Governance Cycle

Context is not a backdrop but an active determinant of implementation success. A governance factor that is critical in one context may be irrelevant in another. Effective implementation strategies must therefore be diagnostically tailored to the specific economic reality, regulatory domain, and problem structure at hand. The ultimate cross-cutting challenge is navigating the transition from rigid, traditional regulatory models towards more flexible, adaptive, and polycentric systems capable of managing the complex, interconnected environmental crises of the Anthropocene.

5. Discussion

This systematic review examines the interrelated governance factors that are important for the effective implementation of environmental laws, and that such factors operate as a complex system and not as an independent factor. The principal argument is that the "implementation gap" may result from multiple systems weaknesses across various governance aspects working in synergy rather than an individual failure. The review identifies five major interrelated pillars of effective implementation governance. The first pillar is the basic pillar regarding an agency to operate effectively can be its financial, human, and technical resources, and also includes state structural characteristics, such as the autonomy, coherence, and necessary expertise. Without this institutional capacity, the effectiveness of the other characteristics are diminished. The second pillar is the power of state assertion through detection, deterrence and sanctioning. This power has credibility based on its actions happening with an anticipated frequency and purposed consistency. The third pillar is transparent accountability and responsible use of powers. Meaning that some forms of direct accountability need to exist to determine if an agency, or a government action is subject to closely reviewed accountability, and therefore a cost to misuse of power can exist. Transparency, in particular, can facilitate accountability or inhibit corruption that could otherwise increase costs and be detrimental to both trust and equity. The fourth pillar is coherence of government actions across sectors and levels to limit the potential of contradictory consistency; this coherence is needed to limit unpredictability and mark for environmental integrity. If multiple forms of incoherence to government policy exist, compliance dilemmas may be created and strain institutional capacity. Finally, fifth pillar is other agency compliance give society social license to state actions by creating voluntary compliance mechanisms, and by engaging the actions of non-state actors as it prepares to anticipate compliance from the public to environmental regulation are perceived to be equitable and fair. Importantly, the existence of effectiveness within these pillars is multiplicative; a severe deficiency in any one pillar will render at least the positive effectiveness of the other pillars irrelevant, such that overall effectiveness will your society will move closer to zero effectiveness. Further, there is potentially contextualizing factors which act as factors, affecting effectiveness as well, including; contextual economics, regulations themselves, and the nature of the concern itself. The review also identifies tensions inherent of environmental law implementation; namely the tensions of balancing the need for efficient and timely decision-making that is participative and inclusive and drawing a legitimate inclusiveness; or combining environmental agency pursuit of prescriptive regulations with the political will to support such legislation and with the available administrative capacity to pursue regulations that are stringent, environmentally optimal and politically capable; and the tension of adaptability of the adaptive governance paradigm and sufficiently uncertain/firm requisite statutory rules of resolution in which socially and economically dependant entities need to plan and make investment decisions. There is an overarching commitment of the emergence of the conclusion that individual guardian actions are inadequate. Implementing effective governance requires system thinking and not just simply responding to a particular question or condition without knowing outcomes that are better recognized as implementation; and needs to frame multiple reforms that are integrated that meet the vulnerable or weakest pillar in a given context. The implications of such pillars to emergent in efficicacy effectively creates a more comprehensive research framework of changing governance aspects, that recognizes the trade-offs of focus.

6. Conclusion and research implications

This systematic review synthesizes literature on governance for the implementation of environmental laws and regulations by focusing on the quality of governance structures promoting implementation, rather than merely the legal design. Ultimately Five pillars of governance emerged that help determine the success of implementation, namely: (1) Monopoly capable of credible monitoring and enforcement, (2) Institutional capacity and design, (3) Transparency for accountability, (4) Policy and legal coherence and: (5) Stakeholder engagement and legitimacy. The depth of the five conditions, though, is multiplicative, with concern for one amplifying the others, so that weakness in any one pillar weakens the whole structure. Based upon this understanding of governance of implementation, it was concluded that the quality of governance—the depth of integrity, capacity, coherence, and legitimacy—represents a better indicator of environmental outcomes than simply the stringency of the law itself. The 'implementation gap' seen across the world is best understood as a 'governance gap.' This review provides policy relevant recommendations as being based in evidence. Before the government enacts new laws regarding the environment, they should conduct an audit of existing implementation governance capability. They would be assessing the capacity for monitoring, independence of institutions and coordination before implementing new governance schemes. Governments should prioritize the investment into remediating the pillars of governance capacity over new regulatory schemes to avoid symbolic legislation. Recommendations included funding of advanced surveillance capital as well as data analytics and legal type of protocols to enable credible consequences of actions detrimental to environmental outcome related objectives. There should also be explicit mandatory mechanisms for purpose of law and policy coherence. These would include requiring environmental assessments for sectoral policies, inter-ministerial committee type of structures with binding power, as well as engaging in green budgeting initiatives. There should also be further evaluation of meaningful, early-stage stakeholder interests in the governance process, moving towards greater participation or co-design processes. This would potentially reduce the cost of implementing enforcement proceedings and increase compliance. Proactive reporting of permitting, monitoring and enforcement data in open formats, along with stronger protections of whistle-blowers and empowered supreme audit and/or anti-corruption agencies would provide factors for conservation of integrity and rebuilding the legitimacy lost over time.

The review outlined potential lines of future research including identifying the empirical potential and risk of AI and machine learning tools in implementation focused research, under the lens of accountability and equity. Research is also needed on the implementation challenges of rights-of-nature laws and governance structures as a starting point. The review also proposed research on private standards practices and ESG investing, and their relationship with government enforced laws to highlight potential green-washing efforts versus measured improved environmental outcomes. Additionally, the review recognized the significance of examining potential solutions through the lens of behavioral economics and implementation barriers, as well as incorporating adaptable governance scheme through case studies. In conclusion, the review emphasized the suggestion that the success of environmental protection is hinging on capacity of governance to implementing the laws and regulations, not simply their legal design. The eminent challenge of governments throughout the Anthropocene stems from the lack of environmental implementation governance capacity, which requires continued investment into building transparent, capable, coherent and legitimate institutions to promote the aspiration of better environmental protection into reality.

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Compliance with ethical standards

Disclosure of conflict of interest

No conflict of interest to be disclosed.

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