NTS Netzwerk Telekom Service AG, Australia.
International Journal of Science and Research Archive, 2025, 16(01), 1946-1956
Article DOI: 10.30574/ijsra.2025.16.1.2237
Received on 17 June 2025; revised on 26 July 2025; accepted on 28 July 2025
The study investigates the use of post-quantum authentication protocols to provide protection of remote professional collaboration frameworks against the anticipated threats that quantum computing would introduce. Since quantum computers pose a risk to the security of all conventional cryptography, a great switchover to post-quantum alternatives is necessary in the development of powerful cryptography in the various communication applications. The research notes that the amplification of the speed, the level of security, and scalability in the implementation of quantum-proof standards is a critical issue which is needed to be addressed. Based on case studies and performance measurements, the research is able to determine important protocols, including lattice-based and multivariate encryption, which have potential relative security without a negative effect on the user experience. The results also point to the need to incorporate such protocols into the current platforms with little to no consequences in terms of the performance of the system and its interaction with users. This research advances the idea of effective guidelines to securing future collaboration tools by making them resistant to quantum attacks, proving almost as fast and scalable as this is necessary in modern working conditions.
Post-Quantum Cryptography; Quantum Threats; Authentication Protocols; Scalability Challenges; Security Solutions; Lattice-Based Cryptography
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Tim Abdiukov. Post-quantum authentication protocols for remote professional collaboration platforms: Balancing Speed, Security and Scalability. International Journal of Science and Research Archive, 2025, 16(01), 1946-1956. Article DOI: https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2025.16.1.2237.
Copyright © 2025 Author(s) retain the copyright of this article. This article is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Liscense 4.0







